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4. Deadly Brotherhood: Local and Symbolic Factors in the Organization of
White "Ultra-Right" Violence in South Africa and Protestant Para-
militarism in Northern Ireland
Mary Catherine Kenney
This research comparing Afrikaners and Ulster Protestants was proposed in 1992 as part of a
projeet of comparative ethnographic studies of the social Organization of political and ethnie
violence. The South African phase of the fieldwork was accomplished through a Post Doctoral
Research Fellowship with the Graduate School "Market State and Ethnicity", at the University of
Bielefeld-Sociology of Development Research Centre, funded by the German National Research
Council (DFG). The fieldwork on Ulster Protestants was carried out whüe the author was a PHD
candidate in anthropology at the University of Michigan.
My hypothesis was this: that two geographicaUy dispersed calvinist settier societies have
employed the social organizational strategies of semi-secret men's clubs and mass political rituals
to pursue their political goals. Have the Ulster Protestants and the Afrikaners used these cultural
and organizational elements in sünüar ways to solve similar historical problems?
The research in the field focused speeifieahy on a comparison of the political cultures of the
Afrikaans speaking Whites in South Africa and the Ulster Protestants in Northern Ireland. The
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proposed research focused particularly on the history and modern roles of paramiütary
organizations in these two calvinist setder societies located in two geographicaUy dispersed
former British colonies. It proposed to investigate, in South Africa, three basic factors in the
social Organization of ethno-potitical violence. These factors are social networks, Symbols of
identity and urban micro territoriality. These three üiterrelated socio-cultural factors were
observed by the author to underlie the political strategies of Protestants in Northern Ireland based
on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork in the mid 1980's (Renney 1991). I was particularly
interested in comparing the political role of the Ulster Protestant "Twelfth of July" celebrations
with the mass assemblies of Afrikaners occurring on the "Day of the Vow"(December 16) in
South Africa. I was also interested in comparing the role of paramiütary organizations among
Afrikaners with that of Loyalist paramiütary groups in Northern Ireland. For example, I wanted
to know if the paramilitary AWB (Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging) are either pubücaUy or
unofficiaüy involved in the main public rituals that celebrate Afrikaner ethnie and national
identity.
Based on the ideas of Louis Hartz (1964) and Marvin Harris (1964) about the history and
social dynamics of setder societies, I hypothesized that cultural and historical simüarities would
account for the apparent similarities in the "ethnie" and political organizational strategies of
Protestants in Northern Ireland and Afrikaners. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that these
apparent similarities in social Organization would have functional consequences for the pattems
of political events in the two countries. The first Step in testing this hypotheses in terms adequate
to both groups was to conduct ethnographic fieldwork in an Afrikaner community in South
Africa to see if, in fact, the two groups have used secret societies and mass political rituals in
similar ways to solve similar historical problems of ethnie competition during the colonial periods
and to consolidate political power over native majorities after the ends of British rule.
A wider theoretical question is raised by this research. Are both situations cases of an ethnie
Organization of conflict? If so, what exactly is "ethnicity" seen as a social process and how and
when should we use ethnicity as a scientific concept for the analysis of group relations (based on
conflict, Cooperation or peaceful coexistence) in complex societies? To answer these questions
cross cultural field research must be carried out specificaUy on these issues. The terms ethnie
group and ethnicity are being used, by social scientists and by the people directly involved in
social movements, to describe a ränge of types of groups, populär movements and conflicts
occurring in different parts of the world. To identify and describe the various sub types of
ethnicity, based on cross cultural Observation and comparison, is an urgent task of social science.
The definition of ethnicity used in this study is that of F. Barth but it represents an attempt to go
beyond his formulations in Ethnie Groups and Boundaries (1969).
In South Africa I studied the role of symbolic processes in historical commemorations (those
celebrations of ethnie and national identity) which take place as annual mass gatherings of the
ethnie group. In both South Africa and Northern Ireland these public rituals include triumphal
pageants (performed by one side of the conflict) and the mass funerals of martyr-heroes (staged
by the other side). I studied some of the poütical and individual uses of the Symbols of group
identity observed in various public rituals. I see certain voluntary associations as the curators of
the Symbols of ethnie identity for an entire ethnie group. In this Situation the groups'
organizational Symbols serve as the Symbols of ethnie and individual identity for the majority of
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the ethnie group that are not members of the Organization (Buckley and Kenney 1995). I asked
this question: Did the Afrikaner Broederbond (a semi-secret mens' club) play a similar role in
Afrikaner ethnicity and politics as the Orange Order (also a semi-secret mens' club) has
historically played among Ulster Protestants? This aspect of the research was based on
participant Observation of Afrikaner public rituals in South Africa.
Based on the work of Abner Cohen (1974) and Jeremy Boissevaüi (1965) - both social
anthropologists who deal with the customary and Strategie uses of Symbols of group identity,
local social Organization, social clubs and national level politics - I examined Afrikaner public
rituals m the context of social Organization. What do the forms of social Organization, made
highly visible in mass ritual, generally reveal about the informal political struetures and strategies
characteristic of an ethnie group? What relation do the pattems and social networks so identified
have to do with and history and the pattern of political events observed as the events are
happenüig?
To answer these questions for the case of the Afrikaners, I conducted fieldwork to answer this
specific question: What are the roles of locahzed support networks and the resulting functional
semi-autonomy in the White Organization of political violence in South Africa? Like in Northern
Ireland are the Afrikaner paramititary groups based in specific rural and rural localities where
they enjoy the overt and covert support of the majority of the white ethnie group and base theü
Operations in the micro territorial "defense and attack fünctions" (Boal 1976) of ethnie enclaves?
If so, what is the historical basis of this communal acceptance of the Operations of paramititary
organizations among Afrikaners (which is different from active support for aU of their actions)
and how does local autonomy conflict with centralized command struetures of political parties
and official paramititary organizations? If so in the case of the Afrikaners, are the symbolic
aspects of ethnicity (the rituals, mass gatherings and cultural organizations) related to locality and
networks? The method used to obtain information on these aspects of the social Organization of
political violence was the ethnographic "community study" approach.
We can safely observe public aspects of the secret Organization of violence in both the context
of local social Organization and public ritual because the public aspects are functional for the
maintainence of the secret aspects. This visibitity is part and parcel of the dynamics of populär
support of violent movements and organizations. I discovered this by doing fieldwork in
Northern Ireland but I hypothesized that similar social dynamics, at work in South Africa, would
allow me to pursue this approach in the case of the Afrikaners. This assumption was basically
correct although the vast spatial scale, and greater social complexity, of South Africa makes it
much more difficult to literally "see" the relationships between the organizations in the Afrikaner
political networks in public cermonies and localized social interactions (including gossip). In the
case of South Africa, more connections must be reconstrueted from the reports of other
observers.
I found that a struggle for the control of mass rituals of identity has been part of the AWB
strategy during the past ten years. Since the early 1980's the AWB has conducted their own "Day
of the Vow" gathering on December 17, held separately from the main Broederbond sponsored
commemoration held at the Vortrekker Monument in Pretoria. This is tike Northern Ireland,
where paramilitary groups have managed to successfiilly take over populär hotidays and public
rituals from more conservative (in the sense of non-violent) ethnie and national organizations,
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meaning that they now organize the main celebration (Kenney 1991). But wltile the participation
rate of Afrikaners in their national rituals and annual mass gatherings is high, it has never been as
complete and coordinated as that of Ulster Protestants in theü organizations and rituals. At one
mass meeting of Ulster Protestants in Belfast that I attended that was held to protest the Anglo-
Irish agreement in 1985, the assembled crowd was estimated at 100,000 people out of a total
Ulster Protestant population of about one million.
The Afrikaners constitute a larger community. There are three mUUon Afrikaners in South
Africa and they are far more widely dispersed over a vast territory. It is probably harder to
achieve functional political unity on the basis of informal networks and annual public rituals under
such circumstances. Although the Ulster Protestants are characterized by many political factions
operating within the larger ethnie group, they have until now been able to effectively unite and
successfully oppose any Suggestion of the rejoining of "their" six counties into an politically
independent "united Ireland". Whüe the Afrikaners have a seif perceived history of faüures of
attempts to unite their factions and achieve unified political action, they effectively united under
the leadership of the Nationalist Party and the Broederbond to rule South Africa, without
compromise, from 1949 until 1990.
A comparison, based on the Organization of the mainly Afrikaner "white Ultra right" in South
Africa with the social Organization of political violence in Northern Ireland (Kenney 1991) shows
that whüe there is a strong local aspect to the AWB, white political violence is not mainly
organized on the level of rural or urban neighborhoods, although the right to march or patrol
armed and in uniform, to be granted the "freedom of the town", is certainly considered as a
demonstration of strength of the local AWB in the Afrikaner domüiated farm towns of the
Orange Free State and the Transvaal.
Along with the tradition of public parading as an indicator of the fighting strength of a party or
faction, like in Northern Ireland, local and regional history is a crucial factor in potiticaUy
truculent and even rebeUious armed bands of Citizens, and even private armies, being considered a
normal (if not always approved of) feature of "civü society" in some parts of the world. In South
Africa, like in Northern ireland, paramititary organizations, observed in the local contexts, are
hard to differentiate, in terms of membership and function, from gangs, mihtia, posses and
vigilantes. For example, the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force - an ultra violent Loyalist paramititary
Organization formed in 1966) takes its name from the Unionist-Protestant force, founded during
the First World War era, to fight against Irish independence. The AWB draws sintilar legitimacy
from the traditon of the Boer Kommandos, the locaUy organized bands of armed farmers that
fought against the British forces in the Anglo-Boer War.
As a frontier people, müitia are part of Afrikaner social Organization and political culture. The
Boer Kommando not only fought British troops but also conducted punitive attacks against
native enemies, the maurauding Bantu warriors and Bushman cattle raiders of Afrikaner populär
history. The very existence of the "laager" (a symbol of the "Volk") is dependant on it's band of
intrepid, and violent, defenders.
A local history, making armed bands a part of the ethnie groups' political culture and a
persistent (if controversial) feature of local community life, is an important factor in a Situation of
passive support or tolerance for the use of violence as a political strategy by violent organizations
who can make a reasonable claim to represent an important aspect of a larger group' s communal,
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ethnie or national identity. I have argued elsewhere that this factor, reflecting Boal, Murray and
Pooles' (1976) "defensive function" of the urban ethnie neighborhood, is largely responsible for
populär support for the Provisional IRA in Catholic districts of Belfast (Kenney 1991). In a social
organizational sense, such locaUy rooted paramititary organizations are characterized by an
overlapping partern of membership with other local groups, including officially paeifistie ones like
Churches. They are covertly part of the same social network system. The community's own "men
of violence" are affected by its customary rules governing behavior to varying extents depending
on how powerful or marginal the paramilitaries are in theü home territories.
I found that, in contrast to Northern Ireland where local rural and urban neighborhoods are
directly linked into a province wide network of organizations and the drama of political and
ethnie violence is largely played out on the local stage, the Operation of Afrikaner political
networks are most significant on the regional and national levels. I think this is partly a reflection
of geographic scale and the history of Vortrekker settiement pattems in South Africa north of the
Cape.
The strongholds of the AWB and the Afrikaner "Ultra Right" in general are the Orange Free
State and the Transvaal, especially in the "the deep North" where I did fieldwork. The Northern
Transvaal is also a stronghold of the far right Conservative Party and of the white racist APK
Church (Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk). This suggests that the potiticaUy functional aspects of
networks are organized more on a regional basis rather than individual towns and rural
neighborhoods. Afrikaner society was overwhelmingly rural until after the Anglo-Boer War (and
especially during the Great Depression) when masses of Afrikaans-speaking poor Whites
migrated to Johannesburg to find employment in industry.
The increasing wealth and upward social mobility of Afrikaners, as white South Africans in the
post-Second World War period, have diluted this factor of local networks even more (although
most of the AWB organizational activity in Johannesburg and Pretoria is centered in lower-
middle class white housing areas düecdy bordering on Black townships). The spatial dimension
of Apartheid has created some aspects of micro-territoriality that affect Whites too, where
random violence and political confrontations do oeeur along White suburban-expandüig Black
township boundaries in this case. However major ineidents of White Ultra Right political violence
don't usually take place in these localized spatial and social contexts. The AWB has territorial
strongholds, urban and rural, but they don't operate mainly on the local stage like the Loyatist
paramilitaries in Northern Ireland tend to do. In contrast, Black township violence is highly
localized like in Northern Ireland (and is also a product of poverty and mass urbanization).
The Afrikaner "right wing" do organize as autonomous sub groups (public, semi secret and
secret) with political violence being planned and carried out by the secret and rival factions.
Although the AWB is the largest Afrikaner paramititary Organization, there are many smaü white
supremacist groups who stockpile arms etc. Reports of the "Thüd Force", operating inside the
army and police, are also true. In Northern Ireland, the covert links between the Protestant
paramilitaries and the police and even the British army have always been an aspect of the dynamic
of violence. In both cases there are many agents at work in the Organization of violence and theü
relations to each other are simüarly mysterious and clouded by speculation. These secret levels of
the Organization of political violence are probably too dangerous for social scientists to study
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direcüy in any society characterized by communal and political violence. We can, however, study
the pubtic aspects.
The APR church is an aspect of this organizational pattern. This body broke away from the
main branch of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa over the issue of racial integration of
church Services and congregations and is officiaüy associated with the right wing Conservative
Party. It is comparable in its history and political function with the Rev. Ian Paisley's Free
Presbyterian Church in Northern Ireland. Like the Free Presbyterians the APR is also unofficially
connected with paramititary organizations, particularly with the AWB. Whüe in South Africa, I
investigated the role of the APR in Pretoria, in EUisras in the Northern Transvaal and in the
"Whites only" Volkstaat colony of Orania, located in the Northern Cape.
My fieldwork revealed that in Eltiras, a mining town in the Northern Transvaal, and in Orania
the various factions and organizations (representing the whole spectram of the Afrikaner political
right), including the paramititary organizations, are present in local communities and in the
movement for Afrikaner territorial independence. These irtiormal consteüations of organizations
are similar to the organizational pattems behind radical political factions in Northern Ireland.
Such arrangements wül prove typical, I believe, of other cases of the social Organization of
political violence viewed cross-culturaUy.
Now it looks like the goal of the Volkstaat wül be pursued constitutionaUy but wül always be
the organizational template that allows the emergence of violence, with the paramüitaries
assuming the effective leadership, if the political process breaks down as a result of Black-Black
conflict. This is because the ideal of the Volkstaat it is a goal that the paramititary factions have
grass roots support for within the larger ethnie group. The idea of the White homeland wul
persist as a symbol of national identity for Afrikaners in a democratic South Africa. Most
Afrikaners today are urbanized and modern in their interests and tifestyles so it won't be a main
Option, just as "UDI" (unilaterally declared independence) for Ulster hasn't sueeeeded except as a
symbolic alternative. An independent Ulster would mean drop in üving Standards for Protestants
as well as Catholics in Northern Ireland. Only the most ideological of the paramilitaries, and
some fundamentalist Protestants would actually enjoy it as a political reality.
The results of my study show that the Afrikaners and the Ulster Protestants use simüar
political strategies although different details and events distinguish the two groups, reflecting the
uniqueness of particular histories. These sintilarities are due to the interaction of cultural factors
and economic forces typical of post colonial social settings and especially of former British
colonies. These organizational strategies, which include political violence, constitute a form of
ethnicity.
Like other ethnie groups throughout the world, Ulster Protestants and Afrikaners make use of
pre-existing organizations and locaUy based social groups and institutions as the framework of
their organizational networks. Whüe conveying a considerable organizational advantage, the use
of locally-based pre-existing organizations, such as churches, is partly responsible for the
typicaüy conservative, even traditionalist, ideological stance and symboüsm of those political
movements identified as "ethnie" by social scientists.
At the present time, almost one year after the first democratic elections in April, 1994, South
Africa seems to be settüng down to a State of violent equiübrium. This reflects a post colonial
version of the strong state-high social conflict political configuration. This is a Situation where
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low-level organized poütical violence, and related high rates of criminal violence, are mainly
localized as permanent feature of townships and former homelands.
South Africa wül be a multi racial, democratic, version of the Afrikaner "laager" society, both
üving with and defending itself against the poor masses. It wül continue to be a physicaUy
dangerous society compared to Westem Europe (especially for the poor who have to live in these
areas) but it wül "work" politicaUy and economically with a authoritarian/liberal government
Controlling but not eradicating violence through periodic and localized suppression by the multi-
racial State.
The Afrikaner paramilitaries wül continue to maintain their micro-territorial strongholds and
threaten succession on the basis of these urban and rural enclaves of Afrikanerdom. This mosüy
rhetorical threat wül be one of the oppositional factors that actually holds the multi-racial
democratic coalition together. The ideal of the Volkstaat wül persists along with the regional and
urban Black Opposition movements (PAC-APLA, Inkatha etc.) and the White paramititary,
Afrikaner secessionist organizations. These endemic and localized factors wül represent political
fault lines and latent sources of political and communal violence. They wül serve as the cultural
themes and scenarios around which conflict in the "new South Africa" wül continue to be
organized. Similarly, paramUitarism wül persist as a latent factor in Northern Irish politics no
matter what the eventual outcome of the present cease-fire wül be, a lasting peace or the
resumption of political violence.
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